不完全契约框架下公私混合基金中剩余权的优化配置——基于政府引导基金参股投资模式的分析被引量：8

The Optimal Allocation of Residual Rights between Public and Private Funds under the Framework of Incomplete Contract——Based on Government Policy Guided Funds’Equity Participation on Venture Capital Funds

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摘要政府引导基金参股创业投资基金是公共资本与私人资本合作投资于创业企业的重要模式。本文从不完全契约视角出发,通过构建模型分析了政府引导基金和与之合作的民间创投机构投入水平的影响因子,以及双方合作中剩余索取权和剩余控制权的均衡配置方案。本文认为合作双方对剩余控制权和剩余索取权的联合拥有是可以达到的最优契约选择,合作双方不同的风险态度是决定最优的剩余权配置比例的主要因素。 State-owned equity＇s participation on venture capital investment funds is an important pattern of public and private capital co-investment in start-up enterprises. From the perspective of incomplete contract, this research constructs a model to analyze factors that influence the investment level of a government policy guided fund and its partner, a private venture investment agency, as well as the balanced allocation of residual control right and residual claim right between the two parties. This text thinks, the cooperative parties＂ combined posses of residual control right and residual claim right is a optimal choice of contract that can be reached, furthermore, the different risk attitudes of cooperators are the main factors to determine the optimal allocation ratio of residual rights.

作者肖艳张书铨

机构地区华东师范大学商学院

出处《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第8期68-76,共9页 Shanghai Journal of Economics

关键词政府引导基金公私混合剩余控制权剩余索取权 Government Policy Guided Fund Public-Private Partnership Residual Control Right Residual Claim Right

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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