资源产权与道德的起源:演化博弈论的诠释

The Origin of Resources Property Rights and Moral: An Interpretation of Evolutionary Game Theory

论文在一个演化经济学视角下考察资源产权和道德(以下简称为产权和道德)自生自发问题。首先,简略地梳理了产权生发研究的历史;介绍了应用博弈论,特别是演化博弈论研究产权生发问题的近况,并指出其不足之处在于博弈支付的社会经济学含义模糊和无法揭示行为博弈与博弈环境相互作用、共同演化的过程。其次,扩展了生物遗传学中适应度的概念,使其适于社会演化分析;分析了社会经济学适应度的构成及其与竞争类型的关系。第三,为了说明行为博弈与博弈环境之间的相互作用关系,在传统复制者动态方程组中,引入状态方程(或组)。第四,采用改进后的复制者动态方程组分析产权和道德自生自发的机理和过程,指出产权和道德都是人类无节制争斗和无约束生育的产物。最后,分析了洛克社会的三大不足,及其继续演化的动力。

This article will investigate how resources property rights and moral emerge spontane- ously. First it will review the history of property rights briefly, introduce the applied Game Theo- ry, especially the recent research about the emergency of property rights through Evolutionary Game Theory. Then it will point out its deficiency which is too ambiguous about the socio-econom- ic meaning of pay-off to reveal the process of interaction and co-evolution between the Game and its environment. Second, it will expand the concept of fitness from the biological genetics to the a- nalysis of the social evolution; and analyze the constitution of socio-economic fitness which is re- lated to its type of competition. Third, it will introduce the condition equation into the traditional Replicator Dynamic Equation, to explain the interaction between Behavior Game and environment of the Game. Fourth, it will investigate how property rights and moral emerge spontaneously through improved Replicator Dynamic Equation, and point out that both property rights and moral were just the result of human＇ s intemperate battle and non-restraint multiplication. Finally, it will analyze three deficienies of Locker＇ s society, and its power to evolve continuously.