卫生经济学视野中的医患合谋

On Doctor-patient Collusion from the Perspective of Health Economics

从分析医患合谋道德风险的影响因素入手,结合卫生经济学的供给曲线和需求曲线探讨产生医患合谋道德风险的原因和规避策略。发现医疗保险的供给方(保险机构)、医疗服务的提供方(医疗服务机构)和医疗保险的被保险方(医疗保险的消费者,即接受医疗服务的消费者或患者)三者之间信息不对称是导致道德风险的重要因素,保险基金风险更多是来自医疗服务提供方的道德风险。建议从建立信息公开制度,加强监督;加强激励,遏制道德风险;运用技术,规范行为三方面规范医疗服务提供方的行为。

Based on Demand Curve and Supply Curve, we discussed what caused the moral hazard in doctor-patient collusion and how to eliminate it. We found the information asymmetry among the supplier of medical insurance （insurance company）, the supplier of medical treatment （hospital） and insurant of medical insurance （the costumer of medical insur- ance, or the embracer of medical treatment, or patient） is an important factor in moral hazard, what＇s more the risk of insurance fund is most come from the supplier of medical treatment. We recommended to establishment of an information disclosure system to strengthen supervision, introducing an incentives to curb moral hazard, using technology to standardize the supplier of medical treatment＇s behavior.