胡塞尔的笛卡尔主义辨析

An Analysis of Husserl's Cartesianism

胡塞尔的先验现象学通常被看成是一种典型的笛卡尔主义,因为他采用了一种与笛卡尔的"普遍怀疑"相似的现象学还原方法,将我们对世界之存在的信念"悬置"起来,回到一个绝对自明的开端和基础,即我思、纯粹意识或"先验自我",然后通过意识的意向性构造把世界本身变成了意识的"意向相关物"。但是本文力求指出,胡塞尔的先验现象学同时包含了一种反笛卡尔主义的维度。因为在他看来,世界不只是意识的意向相关物,而且构成了意识的终极"视域",也就是说,恰恰是世界使得意识的意向性构造成为可能。从这种反笛卡尔主义的路径,胡塞尔后期发展出了生活世界和主体间性等重要思想。不过从总体上说,胡塞尔本人仍然试图站在笛卡尔主义的前提去包容和统一他的反笛卡尔主义维度,消除二者的潜在张力和冲突,尽管他的努力并不成功。

Husserl＇ s transcendental phenomenology is usually regarded as a typical Cartesianism, for he suspends our belief in the existence of the world by means of phenomenological reduction so as to return to an absolutely self-evident starting point and foundation, i. e. , cogito, pure consciousness, or transcendental ego, and makes the world an intentional and correlative character of consciousness. But Husserl＇ s transcendental phenomenology also implies a dimension of anti-Cartesianism. According to him, the world is not only an intentional correlate of consciousness, but also the ultimate horizon of consciousness, that is to say, it is the world that makes the intentional constitution of ~consciousness possible. In accordance with this anti- Cartesianism, Husserl develops many thoughts such as the life world and intersubjectivity in his later period. But as a whole, Husserl＇ s transcendental phenomenology remains Cartesian insofar as he attempts to integrate his anti-Cartesianism into the system of Cartesianism.