革命与危机:皮科论人的尊严与个体自由——兼对特林考斯的一个批评

Revolution and Crisis:Pico's Discussion on Human Dignity and Personal Freedom——A Criticism on Charles Trinkaus

在《论人的尊严》中,皮科旗帜鲜明地指出:人的本性是自由的,可以按照自己的意愿自由地塑造自己的形式。而美国学者特林考斯根据对《创世七日》的研究认定,皮科并未放弃中世纪的奥古斯丁传统,他在《论人的尊严》里强调的自由抉择的尊严,只属于"堕落之前和基督道成肉身之后的人"。特林考斯的这种理解,虽然提示了皮科思想与中世纪传统的关联,但却没有注意到皮科对个体自由作为"人的尊严"之核心的强调,忽略了《论人的尊严》与《创世七日》在神学形态和解释路向上的内在差异,以及《论人的尊严》对不同文化和宗教的开放态度,从而弱化了皮科的革命性和现代意义。实际上,《论人的尊严》与《创世七日》显示的解释路向并非统一,而恰恰反映了皮科在面对个体自由时的内在张力。

In De hominis dignitate （On the Dignity of Man）, Pico della Mirandola clearly indicates that human nature is free, and man can shape his own form freely （ad arbitrium）. However, American scholar Charles Trinkaus holds in light of his research on Heptaplus （ Discourse on the Seven Days of Creation ） that Pico did not really abandon the Augustinian tradition of the Middle Ages. According to him, the dignity which Pico stressed in De hominis dignitate belongs only to ＂man before the Fall and after the Incarnation＂. In this paper, the author will prove that Trinkaus fails to notice Pico＇ s emphasis on personal freedom as the core of ＂human dignity＂, ignoring the internal difference of theological modalities and interpretative ways between De hominis dignitate and Heptaplus, as well as the open view of De hominis dignitate on different cultures and rehgions. As a resuh, the thoughts of Trinkaus tend to weaken the revolution and modernity reflected by Pico, although he reminds us of the relationship between Pico＇ s thought and medieval traditions. In the mind of the author, the interpretative ways of De hominis dignitate and Heptaplus can＇ t be considered as consistent ; on the contrary, they reflect Pico＇ s internal tension over personal freedom.