摘要
本文以中国13家大中型商业银行2001～2011年的年度数据为研究样本，在隐性存款保险制度的背景下，从市场约束角度研究银行规模与市场约束作用之间的关系，分析中国银行业中的“大而不倒”问题。研究结果表明：商业银行规模越大，对市场约束作用的削弱程度越强，外界对银行进行救助的难度也越大；“大而不倒”现象在银行业中广泛存在，并不会因为存款保险制度的不同而产生实质性差异；商业银行的流动性水平越高，受到的市场约束作用越弱，而贷存比和上市指标与银行市场约束的关系则呈现反向关系。
In this paper, the annual data of the Chinese 13 large and medium-sized commercial banks during 2001-2011 are used as samples. Considering the implicit deposit insurance system and from the perspective of market discipline, the paper analyses the relationship between bank size and market discipline, and the phenomenon ＂too big to fail＂ in the Chinese banking sector. The results of the paper show that the larger the bank size is, the more the market discipline is weakened and the more difficult to rescue the bank is; the phenomenon ＂too big to fail＂ is widespread in banking sector, and it can not be essentially different due to the difference in deposit insurance system; the higher the liquidity level of commercial bank is, the weaker the market discipline, but the relationships between the ratio of loan to deposit, listed indicators and the bank market discipline are just opposite.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第9期53-58,共6页
Finance Forum
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区规划基金项目(10XJA630003)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目(CDJSK100204)
关键词
商业银行
银行规模
市场约束
大而不倒
存款保险制度
commercial bank
bank size
market discipline
too big to fail
deposit insurance system
