两级生产与需求不确定下供应链风险共担模型研究

Research on Risk Sharing Model in Supply Chain with Uncertainties in Two-level Yields and Demand

研究原材料生产、产成品生产以及市场需求不确定下供应链风险共担契约与模型。分析了独立无协调决策与集中决策下,供应链系统的生产与订购决策,证明了独立无协调决策下供应商与制造商之间存在的纳什均衡博弈降低了供应链利润。为了降低供应链主体面临的两级生产与需求不确定性的风险,构建了风险共担协调契约与模型,最后进行了算例分析。研究表明,不考虑两级生产与需求不确定性所进行的决策,使得供应链利润显著降低,说明研究两级生产与需求不确定下供应链运作问题具有重要意义;风险共担协调契约,可以减少两级生产与需求不确定性对供应链效益的影响,提高供应商生产的积极性,使得基于风险共担的供应链利润达到了集中决策供应链的利润水平,从而实现供应链系统的帕累托改进。

Supply chain coordination under uncertain environment has been the central theme for the majority of supply chain management researches in recent years. The existing literature mainly studies issues related to optimal operation and coordination in the supply chain with demand or supply uncertainty. It is thus worthwhile to further investigate supply chain members＇ coordination decisions in a two-echelon yields setting in which both two-echelon yields （ namely, the uncertainty in the production of raw materials and in the production of finished goods） and demand uncertainties are present. This paper studies the risk-sharing contract in the supply chain with uncertainties in two-level yields and demand. Firstly, this paper assumes that the supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer as the research objects. Under the decentralized decision-making situations caused by the uncertainty of two-echelon yield and demand, a random game model is established with a random optimization model. We study the optimal order decision for the manufacturer and the optimal production decision for the supplier. We find that the existence of Nash equilibrium game between suppliers and manufacturers under the decentralized non-coordinated decision-making situation. We analyze the relationship between the rationality of the model and coordination of the supply chain through model, example analysis, and a comparative analysis of the decision-making without considering the uncertainty of the demand and production of the supply chains. We find out that the supplier ＇ s production quantity decision usually shows a linear relation with the manufacturer＇s order quantity under the environment of two-echelon yields and demand uncertainty. Supplier and manufacturer face the uncertainty of two-echelon yields and demand. To enable the supply chain to realize the profit of centralized decision-making, we introduce the risk sharing coordination parameters, and establish a cooperative game model of the risk sharing mechanisms given the uncertainty of the two-echelon yield and demand in supply chains. On the basis of model andexample analysis, the paper designs a risk-sharing coordination mechanism. Through the study, the following conclusions can be drawn： （1） The supply chain can produce more overall profit in the centralized decision-making condition than the decentralized one. Supplier＇s production enthuSiasme is higher under the condition of centralized decision-making pattern than the decentralize one. The risk-sharing contract can improve supplier＇s production enthusiasme. （2） With the uncertainty in two-echelon yield and demand, decisions consider the uncertainty in production and demand and can generate more profit than those that do not. The result reveals that the study on the decision-making process for the supply chain bears great significance. （ 3 ） The result reveals that the risk sharing coordination pact proposed by this paper can promote the supplier＇s production quantity of the raw material. Releasing the impact on the profit of supply chain by uncertainties of two-level yields and demand can contribute to the profit of the supply chain. The risk sharing contract can reach the profit level of the supply chain under the centralized decision making pattern in order to reach the Pareto improvement of the supply chain.