转轨制度背景下政治关联与中小企业绩效关系分析

Political Connection,Institutional Environments and the Performance of SMEs

笔者以我国中小上市公司为样本,探讨转轨制度背景下政治关联与中小企业绩效之间的关系,由此来判断中小企业建立政治关联是具有效率促进作用还是阻碍稀缺资源有效配置的寻租手段。基于面板数据模型的实证检验结果表明,中小企业的政治关联无论与企业财务绩效还是市场绩效均存在显著的负相关关系,而且在市场化程度越低、政府支配资源越多和法治水平越差的地区,政治关联的这种负向绩效效应越强。本研究结果支持中小企业建立政治关联的寻租假说,即中小企业建立政治关联时付出的非生产性寻租成本不但加大了企业的负担,而且扭曲了社会稀缺资源的配置,从长远而言不利于企业绩效的提升和持续发展。

Using listed SMEs data in China, this paper analyses the ubiquitous relationship between political connection and enterprise performance, which is considered as a judgment whether political connection, a rent - seeking means, efficiently promotes or unfavor- ably blocks the scare resource allocation. Empirical testing result of the panel data shows that political connection of SEMs significantly and negatively correlates with both enterprise performance and market performance, especially, the lower degree of marketization is, the more resource the government allocates, and the lower degree of rule by law is, the stronger the negative performance effect is. The rent - seeking hypothesis of political connection is supported by the research result, that is, the non - producing rent - seeking cost caused by political connection establishment not only aggravates the burden of enterprise, but also distorts the allocation of social rare resource. In the long run, it is harmful for the enterprise performance promotion and sustainable development.