巨灾保险的市场失效:基于慈善危害视角的研究

Imperfections on the Market for Natural Catastrophic Insurance: the View from Charity Hazard

笔者认为巨灾保险市场的失效除受交易双方之间信息不对称、自然灾害风险特点和个人经验主义影响外,还受慈善危害的影响。分析表明:政府救济和社会捐助等慈善行为对受灾人是一种免费的保险供给,这增加了个人既不参加保险也不采取其他减灾措施的倾向,慈善行为引起的这种危害降低了保险市场的有效需求。为降低慈善危害的影响,政府需要从制度上做出合理的安排和选择,如采取强制性的自然灾害保险、将更多的精力由灾后救济转移为灾前防御、将灾后救济改变为灾前提供保费补贴、将救济资金转投为巨灾保险基金等。

This paper discusses the failure of Catastrophic insurance market affected by charity hazard. Charity hazard is a premium - free insurance provided by others for individuals, which leads individuals＇tendency not to insure or take any other mitigation measures as a result of reliance on excepted financial assistance from governmental relief or donations by NGO or friends. For depressing the im paction of charity hazard, governments need some reasonable institutional arrangements and alternations, for example, mandatory insurance, the redirection of governmental funds from post-catastrophe relief to pre-catastrophe subsidies for insurance premiums or other protective measures.