期刊文献+

中介——交易网络及其代理困境

Intermediary——The Transaction Network and Its Agents Predicament
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摘要 市场交易中交易成本与交易时滞的存在,使交易收益在一定程度上受到减损。市场中介的基本功能就是降低交易成本、缓解交易时滞,以提高市场整体的交易效率。中介为了实现这一基本功能,开辟"出价—要价"机制,成为市场交易信息的集成者,并展开交易匹配,将其所面对的市场交易组织起来。市场信息集成者角色使中介能够展开交易代理业务,委托人对中介进行声誉激励有效地维持了中介以非交易方式获得的财货控制权在交易中的良好实施。中介的交易匹配行为使一个以中介为核心组织起来的交易网络得到观察,其代理行为则使得在时间维度上持续存在的交易网络的部分属性变得易于理解,更为重要的是,对这些属性的观察和理解,可能架设起一座有助于跨越市场与计划两个理论之间的桥梁。 The existence of transaction cost and the transaction time lag causes the transaction benefits to suffer some losses. The basic function of the market intermediation is to reduce the impacts of transaction cost and transaction time lag, so as to increase the transac- tion efficiency of the whole market. In order to realize its function, the intermediary creates the "bid -ask" price mechanism, makes itself the integrated information holder of the market transaction, acts as the transaction matchmaker, and organizes market transac- tions. The role of the market integrated information holder enables intermediary to work as transaction agency and the reputation incen- tive provided by the principal to the intermediary effectively maintains a good implementation of the control rights to the transacted goods obtained by the intermediary in a non - trading way. The intermediary behavior of transaction matching makes the trading net- work with the intermediary at the core observable and the behavior of agency makes some natures of the continually existing transaction network in the time dimension easier understood. More important, the observation and understanding of these natures may help to set up a bridge across the two theories of market and planning.
作者 谢闽
出处 《南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版)》 2013年第2期60-68,共9页 Journal of Nanchang Hangkong University(Social Sciences)
关键词 中介交易 声誉激励 持续存在的交易网络 intermediated transaction, reputation incentive, continually existing transaction network
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