政府补贴、海洋排污与效益均衡选择——基于进化博弈理论

Benefit equilibrium selection between governmental subsidies and pollution discharge based on evolutionary game theory

涉海排污企业超标排放导致海洋环境日益恶化,而政府补贴有利于海洋排污问题的改善。文章在引入政府补贴的前提下,利用进化博弈论的思想并通过复制动态及稳定性分析来研究海洋排污问题中政府与排污企业的效益均衡博弈模型。结果表明:在长期的反复博弈过程中,政府和企业是相互依赖的,当政府对超标企业的罚款小于监管成本、企业采取措施处理超标污水的费用大于补贴、利润增额与因超标排污的罚款额之和或者仅小于利润增额时,该博弈存在进化稳定策略,即政府和企业实现效益均衡状态。

Enterprises＇ overproof discharging pollutants to sea makes marine environment deteriorating. Governmen- tal subsidies help improve the problem of marine pollution. Under the premise of giving governmental subsidies, this paper analyses the benefit equilibrium model between enterprises and government in the problem of marine pol- lution by evolutionary game theory. Through the replicator dynamics and stability analysis, the results show that in the long process of game, the government and enterprises are interdependent, and when the discharge enterprises is smaller than government＇ s supervision cost, or enterprises＇ cost for is larger than the sum of subsidies, gains and fine, or is just smaller than the gains, there stable strategies, that is the government and enterprises come to benefit balance. fine paid by overproof dealing with the waste are three evolutionary