中国影子银行的金融监管研究——运用市场约束优化政府监管

On the Financial Regulation System of China's Shadow Banking: Optimization of Government Regulation with Market Constraints

金融危机爆发以来,加强影子银行监管的呼声空前高涨,监管当局试图修正监管规则,以适应最新的金融产品结构和业务的变化。但是,影子银行凭借其创新性、自由化、复杂化,开创了一条"创新—监管制止—再创新"的监管套利模式,而政府监管总是滞后于金融创新。为提高影子银行监管的有效性,需引入市场约束规则,充分发挥市场主体的作用。市场约束可以在一定程度上弥补官方监管的缺陷,即逐步在以政府监管为主的体系中运用市场约束,以实现政府监管与市场约束的最佳配合。

Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the calling to strengthen the regulation of shadow banking reached an all-time high. Regulatory authorities tried to fix rules to adapt to the new financial product structure and the change of the business, but shadow banks created the regulatory arbitrage model of ＂innovation-regulated-re-innovation＂ by its innovativeness, liberalization and complexity, which always run ahead of government regulation. In order to effectively improve the supervision of the shadow banking, market constraints should be introduced and the role of the market should be given full play. Market constraints can, to a certain extent, make up the defects of official supervision, namely, restore the market constraints gradually in a government regulation system, eventually realizing the optimal coordination of the government regulation and market discipline.