论科技创新外部性的法律干预进路

On the Path for Law to Intervene with the Externalities of Scientific and Technological Innovation

科技创新语境下的外部性与传统的外部性相比,更多地表现为一种正外部性,因此,从供应层面来说,发明人不需要俘获他们科技创新的全部社会价值,社会只需要给予他们足够的激励以补偿模仿者不愿支付的创新固定成本即可;从需求层面来说,由于私人从事科技创新并不能俘获他们创造的全部社会价值,私人投资的意愿低于社会的期望,从而导致愿意从事科技创新的人数低于社会的需要量。因此,应建立适合科技创新外部性特征的国家分类干预模式:对具有基础设施特征的基础科学创新和非商业性应用技术创新采取政府拨款和信息共享的政府干预模式;对商业性应用创新实行私人产权与公有制度相结合的混合干预模式。

The externalities of scientific and technological innovation is more positive than traditional externalities. On the supply side, inventors do not need to capture the full social value of their inventions in order to have suffi- cient incentive to create. Society needs merely to give them enough incentive to cover the fixed costs of creation. On the demand side, productive users do not capture the full social value of their inventions. Their private willingness to pay accordingly understates the social value of their use. The problem here is that the demand manifested by produc- tive users falls short of social demand. Thus the optimal path for government to intervene with the externalities of sci- entific and technological innovation is that we should insist on the dual paths to intervene externalities of innovation, namely, government may take grant and information sharing to basic and noncommercial researches and establish the mixed regime of property and commons of innovation for the commercial application.