物流联盟协同创新的两阶段动态激励模型

Two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance

为了提高物流联盟的协同水平与收入状况,以盟主(第三方物流)的收入为目标函数,以盟员的激励相容和保留收入为约束条件,建立了物流联盟协同创新的两阶段动态激励模型。当协同和创新2项任务成本的可替代程度变化时,计算了最优激励系数与最优努力水平,并比较了单期静态与两阶段动态激励下盟员的固定收入与盟主的收入。分析结果表明:当盟员的保留收入为60万元,可替代程度分别为0.2、0.3、0.4、0.5、0.6、0.7时,单期静态激励下盟员的固定收入分别为-108.77、-109.53、-108.48、-106.30、-103.34、-99.93万元,两阶段动态激励下盟员的固定收入分别为-123.67、-110.65、-99.51、-89.83、-81.62、-74.47万元;单期静态激励下盟主的收入分别为109.22、110.09、109.11、106.95、103.95、100.32万元,两阶段动态激励下盟主的收入分别为124.54、111.72、100.73、91.18、82.81、75.30万元,增加比例分别为14.03%、1.48%、-7.68%、-14.75%、-20.34%、-24.94%。盟员的固定收入、最优激励系数与最优努力水平均随可替代程度增大而增大,当可替代程度为0.2时,盟主获得的收入最大,方案最优。

In order to improve the synergy level and income status of logistics alliance, the income of third party logistics （TPL） was taken as objective function, the incentive compatibility constraint and retained income of member were taken as constraint conditions, and the two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance was established. With the change of substitutable degree for the two tasks such as synergy and innovation, the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal effort level were calculated, and the fixed incomes of member and the incomes of TPL under the single stage static incentive and the two-stage dynamic incomes of TPL are 1.092 2, 1.100 9, 1.091 1, 1.069 5, 1.039 5, 1.003 2 million yuan respectively under the single-stage static incentive and are 1. 245 4, 1. 117 2, 1. 007 3, 0. 911 8, 0. 828 1, 0. 753 0 million yuan respectively under the two-stage dynamic incentive, the incomes of TPL increase 14.03%, 1.48%, -7.68%, -14.75%, -20.34%, -24.94% respectively. The fixed income of member, the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal effort level increase with the increase of substitutable degree. When substitutable degree is 0.2, the income of TPL is maximum, and the scheme is optimal. 3 tabs, 3 figs, 22 refs.