央行对公众行为反应规则的博弈分析

A Study in the Game on the Reactionary Rules of the Central Bank to Public Behavior

央行对公众行为的反应规则是当前预期管理研究的课题之一。研究首先以Kydland和Prescott(1977)有关央行决策的经典模型为基础,分析认为管理预期可以平滑通胀波动提高货币政策有效性;其次,建立博弈模型,探讨在完全信息静态和非完全信息动态条件下,央行如何根据公众预期制定货币政策保持经济稳定,这有别于央行根据宏观经济变量制定货币政策的传统思路;最后,本文提出央行加强预期管理的政策建议。

The reactionary rules of the central bank to public behavior is one of the research topics about management of expections. Fristly, by analyzing the classic model about central bank decision- making which is maded by Kydland and Prescott（ 1977 ） , we conclude that the management of expections is more conductive to smoothing market inflation fluctuations and improving the efficiency of monetary policy. Secondly, we made a game model to study how the central bank make monetary policy to maintain economic stability by the public expectations in the complete information static or in dynamic incomplete information condition. It is a new idea different from the central bank according to the macro economic variables to set monetary policy. Finally, the paper proposes that central bank strengthen management of expectations when formulating the prudent monetary policy.