自愿性环境政策工具与管制压力的关系——来自经济模型的验证

Voluntary Environmental Policy Approaches and Regulation Pressure: A Simple Economic Model

自愿性环境政策工具是企业与管制机构博弈的结果,管制压力是影响该工具制定与效果的关键因素,那么,管制压力是如何影响自愿性工具呢?为了解释管制压力对自愿性环境协议的影响过程,文章建构了一个简单的经济模型,验证管制压力与自愿性协议的关系。研究表明:第一,管制压力是企业决定是否参加自愿性协议的主要因素;第二,自愿性协议中所确定的自愿削减量是管制机构与企业博弈均衡的结果,均衡结果有可能是最优自愿削减量,该削减量大于管制工具所强加的最优削减量,但是最优自愿削减量的产生依赖于强的管制压力。

Voluntary environmental policy tools are the result of the game between enterprises and regulatory agencies. Regulatory pressure is the key factor affecting the tools. This research focuses on how regulatory pres-sure influences the setting and performance of voluntary tools. In order to answer this question, this study constructs a simple economic model to test the relationship between regulation pressure and voluntary agreements. This model presents two conclusions： firstly, pressure coming from the regulatory agency is the most important factor in enterprises deciding whether to sign voluntary agreements ; second, pollution reduction targets in volun- tary agreements are the resuh of game equilibrium. The equilibrium result may be the optimum voluntary reduc- tion and greater than reductions imposed by regulation tools, but optimal voluntary reduction relies on strong regulatory pressure.