耐用品二手市场信息对垄断厂商决策影响研究

Impact of information in second-hand markets of durable goods to monopolist's strategic decision

从消费者效用的角度,通过构建两期的决策模型来分析当耐用品质量不稳定的情况下二手市场信息对耐用品垄断厂默决策的影响.研究结果表明:在稳定均衡状态下,当消费者对耐用品的情绪效用比在某定值之下时,二手市场消费者买卖双方信息不对称情况下的耐用品垄断厂商表优产量比信息对称情况下的最优产量大;二手市场信息不对称情况下耐用品的一手市场出清价格和二手市场出清价格分别低于信息对称情况下的相应价格;当消费者对耐用品的情绪效用比处在某特定范围内时,二手市场信息不对称情况下垄断厂商的每期最优利润比信息对称情况下相应的最优利润大.

From the perspective of consumer utility,a two-stage decision model was built to analyze the impact of information in second-hand markets on the monopolist＇s strategic decision when the durable goods quality is unstable.The results show that：if the ratio of emotion to utility on durable goods,which consumers have,is lower than the fixed value,then the optimal output produced by durable goods monopolists with asymmetric information in secondary markets is more than with symmetric information; the clearing price of durable goods in the primary market and the secondary market with asymmetric information are both lower than the corresponding price in the case of symmetric information; furthermore,if the ratio of emotion to utilities on durable goods lies in a certain range,then the monopolist＇s optimal profits in each phase with asymmetric information in second-hand markets are more than those with symmetric information.