“店选网购”跳单问题的竞争关系分析——以图书行业为例

Analysis of the Competitive Relationship in Jump-Dealing——Representing Case of SBWP in Book Industry

随着互联网和电子商务的兴起,在实体店选择体验而在网上购买的"店选网购"跳单现象①相当普遍,引发诸多经济学与法学问题。典型的行业有服装、电子、电器、家居、化妆品和图书。其中图书行业受冲击最大,争议较多,但存在诸多误区。本文依据纵向产业组织理论(特别是纵向价格双轨制理论),以"店选网购"跳单问题为重点,对这些误区进行剖析,厘清关系,揭示实质,总结出"店选网购"的三个"跳单定律":①店商与网商专业化程度越强(或一体化程度越弱),跳单现象和搭便车问题则越多。②偏好个性化需求与体验化服务的顾客多选择店选店购,偏好标准化需求与便捷化服务的顾客多选择直接网购,介于两者之间的顾客则多选择店选网购,而只有店选网购模式存在跳单问题。③店选网购是跳单的必要条件,而渠道价差较大是跳单的充分条件,跳单率与价差率成正比。在此基础上,初步提出"跳单与RPM互克理论",同时为企业和政府提出策略选择和政策建议。核心结论是,如果确认企业RPM策略产生了明显的排除和限制竞争效果,则应鼓励和支持消费者的跳单行为;如果确认消费者跳单行为导致了值得关注的反竞争后果和严重的搭便车问题,则应豁免企业的RPM策略行为。

Following the blooming of internet and E-commerce, store-browsing-web-purchasing （SBWP, or showrooming） widely emerges, a pattern such that trial at real-body store while make the purchase through web, introducing numerous issues of economics as well as law. Industries that feature with this pattern are clothing, electronic devices, cosmetics and books. Among all, books industry suffers the most, rising various disputes, however many are mistaken. This paper based on vertical industrial theory（especially vertical dual-pricing system）, majorly focusing on SBWP jump-dealing behavior, analyze mistaken fields, clarify and reveal underlying relations, then summarize to three ＂jump-dealing modes＂ of SBWP： ①The finer specialization of store firm and web firm（the less integration between store and web firm）, the more of jump-dealing and free rider will be. ②Consumers with individual and trial service preference are more likely to choose store-browsing-store-purchasing （SBSP）, and consumers with standardized and convenient service preference are more likely to choose web-browsing-web- purchasing （WBWP）, while consumers in between are incline to choose store browsing-web-purchasing（SBWP）, however, jump-dealing only exists in the third pattern. ③SBWP is necessary to jump-dealing, and price difference between channels is the sufficient condition, jump-dealing is positively correlated with price difference ratio. Based on these three modes, we bring up the ＂jump-dealing and RPM offsetting theory＂, at the same time, offer strategy choices and policy suggestions to firms and government. Core conclusions are the following： If firms RPM strategy substantially eliminate and restrict competition, then jump-dealing behavior should be encouraged; If jump-dealing behavior leads to substantial anti-completion and free-rider issues, then firms RPM strategy should be exempted. Equivalently saying, if jump-dealing is overwhelming（and price difference ratio tends to shrink）, then RPM should not be a concern; Otherwise, anti-monopoly agency should intensify law enforcement towards RPM strategy.