公共财政补贴内生化与闭环供应链的短期均衡结果分析

The Short-term Equilibrium Outcome Analysis of the Closed-loop Supply Chain with Endogenous Public Financial Subsidies

许多国家的政府都以不同的形式介入循环经济的成长或转型过程。本文研究了政府作为决策主体以公共财政支出的方式补贴回收再制造活动的短期均衡结果。分别建立和求解了政府财政补贴为外生参数、政府分别以公共财政支出为目标和以全社会总福利为目标且财政补贴为内生变量的动态博弈模型,其中假定回收量是回收价格的单调增函数,财政补贴将会影响到回收商的回收价格决策,进而影响到回收量的增加。对均衡结果的分析表明:财政补贴内生化时的财政支出是当财政补贴为外生参数时的财政支出的最小值,外生的财政补贴几乎一定会导致回收不足和/或回收过度的结果;作为整个循环经济系统绩效指标之一的最优回收量与单位废弃物处理的边际成本成正比;相对于以财政支出为目标的均衡结果,政府以全社会总福利为目标的最优补贴将导致更高的最优回收量、社会总福利和财政支出。

The development of recycling economy has great positive external economic effects, so it is logical for government to intervene in its growth process. In this paper, we study the short-term equilibrium outcome of the government as a decision-maker subsidizing remanufacturing activities in a way of public expenditure. We set up and solve the dynamic game model of government financial subsidies as an exogenous parameter, government financial subsidies as endogenous variables with the target of public financial expenditure and with the target of total social welfare, respectively. The analysis of the equilibrium outcome shows that： （1） fiscal expenditure of endogenous financial subsidies is the minimum value of financial subsidies as an exogenous parameter, and the exogenous financial subsidies will almost certainly lead to results of under recovery or excessive recovery; （2） total optimal recovery as a performance indicator of the entire circular economy system is proportional to the unit waste disposal marginal cost, and the unit waste disposal marginal cost will continue to rise with the increase of total economic output if we do not strengthen the remanufacturing efforts; （3） relative to the equilibrium outcome with the target of financial expenditure, the government＇s optimal subsidies with the target of total social welfare will lead to higher total optimal recovery, total social welfare and fiscal expenditure.