企业绩效考评中的推定原则与逆向选择

Presumption Principle and Adverse Selection of Performance Evaluation

本文旨在将对逆向选择问题的研究延伸到企业绩效考评过程中。在信息不对称条件下,考评主体不得不在企业绩效考评中引入合格推定原则。在基于合格推定的考评对象的行为决策模型中,考评主体认定的绩效与绩效的自然状态发生偏离,一部分事实不达标绩效被推定为达标绩效。将不达标绩效推定为达标的可能性驱使考评对象有可能选择偷懒策略,即生成逆向选择。按照完全理性假定,考评对象按后悔值最小原则进行行为策略抉择。走出绩效推定情境中逆向选择困境的基本思路是提高考评对象采用偷懒策略的后悔值。为此,一方面要提高考评主体认知考评对象实施偷懒策略的概率;另一方面要增大考评对象实施偷懒策略的或有损失。

This paper aims to extend the adverse selection issue to enterprise performance evaluation process. The evaluators have to introduce presumption principle into performance evaluation under information asymmetry. Based on the decision- making model of the assumed qualified evaluator＇s behavior, the performance indentified by the evaluators deviates from the natural state of the performance, and some factual substandard performance is presumed standard, which may make the evaluation objects choose lazy strategies, i.e. generating adverse selection. According to the assumption of complete rationality, evaluation objects determine their behavioral strategies by the minimum principle of regret value. To avoid the adverse selection dilemma, it is essential to improve the regret value of lazy strategies adopted by evaluation objects, improve the probability that evaluation subjects recognize their lazy strategies, and increase the losses caused by lazy strategies.