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基于弱关系的民间借贷声誉形成机制和担保机制研究 被引量:5

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摘要 建立在弱关系基础上的民间借贷其目的已不再是互惠,而且处于弱关系中的借贷双方相互之间的信任程度及信息对称程度都不如强关系,那么民间借贷为什么会存在于弱关系之中?弱关系借贷是如何防范风险的?本文构建了基于贝叶斯法则的声誉修正模型,分析了基于弱关系的民间借贷声誉形成机制和担保机制,认为声誉在基于弱关系的民间借贷中发挥了担保的作用,正是声誉的这一作用降低了基于弱关系的民间借贷风险,因此,民间借贷才会产生于弱关系之中,民间金融也不会随着农村社会的逐步商业化而消失或减弱。
作者 赵丙奇
机构地区 宁波大学商学院
出处 《社会科学战线》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第10期63-68,共6页 Social Science Front
基金 国家自然科学基金(71273143) 浙江省哲学社会科学规划之江青年课题(13ZJQN113YB) 浙江省软科学项目(2012C35070) 宁波市软科学项目(2012A10075)
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