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主从竞争供应链博弈分析 被引量:6

Game Analysis Between Leading and Following Competitive Supply Chains
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摘要 考虑两条均由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的竞争供应链模型,链间采用Stackelberg博弈,而链内分别考虑制造商主导和零售商主导两种情况.考察了在链内企业实力不同时对供应链之间的竞争有何影响.分析了当企业实力发生改变时,对己链以及他链成员的最优决策有何影响.最后对反映供应链竞争程度的(?)_i做灵敏度分析.结果表明任何供应链内部主导权的改变对链与链之间的竞争没有影响.链内企业之间的博弈只是一种内耗.当两条链实力旗鼓相当时,后进入市场的供应链具有"后动优势"以及竞争加剧对各方都有利. This paper studies two competitive supply chains both of which consist of one manufacturer and one retailer. The game rule between two chains is Stackelberg game and the rule in chain is manufacturer Stackelberg or retailer Stackelberg. We investigated the influence on competition between supply chains under different company power and ana- lyzed the influence on optimal strategies when companies' power change. Finally, sensitivity analysis of ri which reflects the degree of supply chain competition is given. The results show that any supply chain internal power change has no effect on the competition between the chain and chain. The game between enterprises in one chain is only a kind of internal friction. When two chains strength evenly matched, the supply chain into market later has "the late-move advantage" and increasing competition is beneficial to all companies.
作者 曾伟 周永务
出处 《应用数学学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2013年第5期769-782,共14页 Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica
基金 国家自然科学基金(71131003) 国家自然科学基金青年基金(71201044) 国家社科基金青年基金(12CGL041) 教育部社科基金青年基金(10YJC630014) 教育部高校博士点基金(2012JYXJ0842 合肥工业大学博士基金(2012HGBZ0197)资助项目
关键词 竞争供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 后动优势 competitive supply chains stackelberg game late-move advantage
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参考文献22

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