财政支出、支出竞争与中国地区经济增长效率

Fiscal Expenditure,Expenditure Competition and China's Regional Economic Growth Efficiency

在"中国式分权"的制度背景下,中国地方政府的财政支出以及支出竞争是促进经济增长的重要推力,但也带来了城乡差距扩大、支出结构偏向以及地区市场分割等负面影响。本文使用Simar和Vanhems(2012)提出的条件方向性距离函数测算以支出竞争为条件的、并包含支出竞争正面产出与负面产出的经济增长效率。在此基础上,利用1985-2009年的中国省际面板数据,建立空间面板数据模型,分析支出竞争对中国地区经济增长效率的影响。实证结果表明,在全国范围内,财政支出与经济增长效率并无显著关系,财政分权对经济增长效率有显著的促进作用,支出竞争与经济增长效率之间存在显著的非线性作用,因此应当构建一种"适度竞争"的政府激励机制以提升经济增长效率。

The fiscal expenditure and expenditure competition of China＇s local government are important driving forces of economic growth on the institution background of ＂Federalism,Chinese Style＂, but also brings about a lot of negative effect such as widening urban-rural gap, unbalanced tendency of fiscal expenditure structure and regional market segmentation. Based on China＇s provincial data from 1985 to 2009, this paper utilizes the conditional directional distance functions （Simar and Vanhems, 2012） to calculate the economic growth efficiency which includes both positive and negative outputs led by fiscal expenditure competition, and then uses spatial panel data model to analyze the effect of expenditure competition to economic growth efficiency. The empirical research shows that, fiscal expenditure doesn＇t have significant effect on economic growth efficiency, but fiscal decentralization has significant effect on economic growth efficiency. Meanwhile, there is nonlinear relation between expenditure competition and economic growth efficiency. So we suggest that central government should construct a ＂ moderate competition＂ mechanism to promote economic growth efficiency.