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锦标制度及其发展:一个文献综述 被引量:2

Rank-order Tournament and its Development:a Literature Review
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摘要 锦标制度是通过相对绩效评价来研究委托代理关系的一种重要激励机制。通过对个体产出从最高到最低排序的办法,最大程度上实现对可观测变量所包含信息的充分利用,从而减少代理人共同的不确定因素影响,解决委托人或代理人的道德风险,提高绩效产出。在此基础上,本文对锦标制度三十余年来理论研究和实践探索方面取得的显著成果进行文献梳理,并提出未来可能的发展方向,以期加速推进相关理论创新发展的进程。 Rank-order tournament is an important theory of incentive mechanism in the principal agent relationship which is based on the comparison of individual relative performance.Through the ranking method from the highest individual output to the lowest,it can achieve the greatest degree information utilization of the observable variable and reduce the impact of the uncertainty,solving the principal or agent's moral hazard as well as improving outputs.In order to accelerate the development process of rank-order tournament,the paper then summarizes the research status on rank-order tournament scheme for more than thirty years in two aspects:theoretical research and practical exploration,and puts forward the possible future development direction.
作者 宋妍
出处 《社会科学管理与评论》 CSSCI 2013年第3期42-54,111,共13页 Management and Review of Social Sciences
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2013W04)
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参考文献58

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二级参考文献124

共引文献883

同被引文献25

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