施工项目经理道德风险的博弈分析与对策研究

Game Analysis and Countermeasure Study on Moral Hazard of Construction Project Managers

施工项目经理在建设工程项目中发挥着举足轻重的重要作用,但是,由于人的逐利本性和信息不对称等客观情况的存在,其道德风险行为的产生在所难免。本文通过分析施工项目经理的职责,指出其常见的道德风险行为,基于委托代理理论原理和博弈论工具,建立了建筑施工企业与施工项目经理之间的博弈模型,得到项目经理发生道德风险行为和建筑施工企业选择监管之间的博弈均衡解。提出引入风险抵押金、工作绩效考核和绩效工资制度等防范项目经理道德风险行为,并进行了博弈分析。经过对博弈均衡解的重新计算,验证施工项目经理发生道德风险行为概率的降低,从而证明引入上述制度可作为防范施工项目经理道德风险的有效对策。

Project managers play vital important roles in construction projects, however, owing to the profit-driven nature of human beings and the existence of objective circumstances such as information asymmetry, their moral hazard behavior is unavoidable. This paper points out the common moral hazard behaviors of construction project managers by analyzing their responsibilities, and establishes a game model between construction enterprises and project managers. Based on principal-agent theory and game theory, we obtain the game equilibrium between construction project managers＇ moral hazard behavior and construction enterprises＇ supervision. We make a game analysis to suggest prevent from construction project managers＇ moral hazard behavior by bringing in risk mortgage system, performance appraisal and performance salary system. After recalculated the game equilibrium solution, the results show that the construction project managers＇ moral hazard behaviors probability reduced, which proved introducing the above systems is effective to prevent moral hazard.