政府干预、跨区域并购与公司治理溢出效应

Government Intervention,Cross-Regional Merger&Acquisitions and Spillover Effect of Corporate Governance

以股权分置改革后的并购事件为样本,以并购后竞争优势衡量公司治理溢出效应,研究政府干预对跨区域并购公司治理效应的影响。研究发现,在政府干预下,公司跨区域并购没有取得治理溢出效应,即存在"跨区域并购悖论"。地方国有企业跨区域并购竞争优势显著劣于同区域并购,这是该悖论产生的根源并证实了"政府干预假说",中央企业跨区域并购竞争优势弱优于同区域并购,地方经济负担转嫁是同区域并购的主要动因。同区域并购后地方国有企业、中央企业竞争优势分别与减少政府干预指数显著负相关和正相关,民营企业跨区域并购竞争优势与同区域并购无显著差异。

This paper uses the samples of merger ＆ Acquisitions after the reform of split of shares to study the spillover effects of corporate governance in terms of competitive advantage after merger ＆ acquisitions, and the effects of government intervention on corporate governance of cross- regional merger ＆ acquisitions. The fmdings show that under the goverma^nt intervention, cross- regional merger ＆ acquisitions fail to achieve governance spillover effects, namely paradox of cross - regional merger ＆ acquisitions. The competi- tive advantage of cross- regional merger ＆ acquisitions between local state- owned enterprises is significant- ly inferior to merger ＆ acquisitiorrs in the same region. It verifies ＂Government Intervention Hypothesis＂. The competitive advantage of cross- regional merger ＆ acquisitions between enterprises owned by the central government is inferior to merger ＆ acquisitions in the same region. Burden transfer of local economy is the driving force of merger ＆ acquisitions in the same region. After merger ＆ acquisitions in the same region, the competitive advantage of local state - owned enterprises is significantly negatively correlated with reducing government intervention index and the competitive advantage of enterprises owned by central government is positively correlated with reducing government intervention index. There is no significant distinction between the competitive advantage of cross- regional merger ＆ acquisitiom between private - owned enterprises and the competitive advantage of merger ＆ acquisitions between private - owned enterprises in the same region.