为什么跨小区的业主组织联盟存在差异 一项基于治理结构与政治机会(威胁)的城市比较分析

Why Does Homeowners' Cross-Neighborhood Organizational Coalition in Shanghai Differ from That in Guangzhou?A City-Level Comparative Analysis of the Governance Structures and Political Opportunities(Threats)

本文结合社会运动联盟理论和城市治理理论,比较了上海和广州两个城市跨小区的业主组织联盟形态,提出一个基于治理结构与政治机会(威胁)的比较分析框架来理解两个城市业主组织联盟形态的差异。研究发现,与广州相比,上海的物业管理制度更加完善,基层治理组织架构也更加健全,体制内支持者相对缺乏,从而降低了社会冲突发生以及冲突激化为社会性公共议题的可能性。考虑到都市抗争的反应性特征以及中国社会管理体制所具有的社会控制和利益表达双重功能,都市抗争研究应该具体分析行动限制的制度根源、国家在预防社会抗争出现以及在抗争过程中的多重角色。

This paper presents a comparative study of homeowners ＇ organizational coalition in Shanghai and Guangzhou. Based on the analyses of the data from documents, first-hand interviews and Internet networks, homeowners＇ organizational coalition in Shanghai is found to be weaker than that in Guangzhou. This paper proposes an analytical framework, which integrates the insights from social movement coalition studies and urban governance studies, to explain the differences in the homeowners＇ cross- neighborhood coalition in the two cities. Compared with Gangzhou, the residential governance system in Shanghai is relatively advanced and the probability for the homeowners to experience common threats and severe right infringement is relatively low~ hence, less likely for the homeowners in different residential communities to collaborate. In addition, the highly developed grassroots governance structure in Shanghai also has the capacity to pre-empt the radicalization of conflicts and prevent them from becoming city- wide public issues. Finally, lack of allies within the institutional system is also a contributory factor to the homeowners＇ localized collective action at the neighborhood level in Shanghai. Given the responsive nature of contention at the city level in China and the Chinese social management system＇s dual functions of social control and interest representation, future urban-contention studies should pay attention to the institutional roots of contenders＇ claims and institutional constraints on collective contention as well as state＇s multifaceted roles, On the one hand, the state can, to some extent, pre-empt the emergence of large-scale collective actions through institutional design. On the other hand, availability of intuitional allies plays an important role in facilitating the formation of lateral coalition.