摘要
将银行与中小企业间的动态博弈过程视为一个"模仿学习"的渐进系统,在考察银行贷款成本、中小企业还款成本及其群体特征的基础上,运用演化博弈论构建中小企业抵押贷款及互助担保贷款的演化博弈模型,对比分析两种贷款模式的演化路径及其相应条件,探讨如何缓解中小企业融资难问题.结果表明抵押贷款在现实条件下无法达到最优均衡状态,而互助担保贷款既可以增强中小企业的融资能力,又规避了银行的贷款风险,推动银行与企业动态博弈过程向最优均衡解演化,达到互利双赢.
The dynamic game process between banks and SMEs has been taken as an ＂imitation learning＂ progressive system, by inspecting bank loans costs, SMEs repayment costs, and their group identity, using evolutionary game theory to build up SMEs evolutionary game model of mortgage loan and mutual guarantee loan, comparing and analyzing the evolution paths and their corresponding conditions of these two lending models to explore ways in which SMEs＇ financing problems could be relieved. Results showed us that mortgage loans could not achieve the optimal equilibrium state in real conditions, however, mutual guarantee loans could either enhance the financing capacity of SMEs, or avoid the risks of bank loans, promoting dynamic game processes to the evolution of optimal equilibrium between banks and enterprises, so as to achieve mutual benefit and win-win.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第17期59-68,共10页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"中小企业集合债券信用风险度量及控制研究"(10YJA790011)
