双重信息不对称下虚拟企业监督策略

Monitoring strategies of virtual enterprise under dual information asymmetry

针对虚拟企业中道德风险和逆向选择并存下的双重信息不对称问题,结合Stackelberg博弈模型和激励机制理论,分别建立了相应的基于盟员的私有信息和行动的两种策略下的两阶段委托代理监督模型激励盟员,并甄别其私有信息.求解模型并将两种监督策略与不监督的情形比较,证明了盟主委托监理组织对盟员的监督是有效的,且基于行动的监督策略更有效.通过算例表明上述结果对虚拟企业的运营实践具有很好的指导意义.

For the dual information asymmetric problem in virtual enterprise（VE） with both moral hazard and adverse selection,by incorporating Stackelberg game model and the theory of incentive mechanism,the two stage principal-agent monitoring models based on the partner＇s private information and effort are derived to incentive the partner and screen the true information respectively.Furthermore,the corresponding optimal monitoring strategies are analyzed and compared with the no monitoring scenario.The results verify the effectiveness of hiring the monitoring organizations to monitor the partner,and the action monitoring strategy is more effective.The numerical example is given to show that the conclusion is valuable to the operation of VE.