全球化下发展中国家中央银行独立性与FDI的关系

The Relationship between the CBI and FDI of Developing Countries in a Global Context

20世纪80年代末以来,在世界范围内掀起了一股中央银行独立的浪潮。发展中国家中央银行独立性对吸收外国直接投资具有促进的作用,这主要基于一种信号机制。从信号机制的整个过程来看,发展中国家中央银行的独立是一种提高可信度的制度安排;从信号内容的实际效果来看,中央银行独立将带来相对的低通胀预期、货币政策稳定预期与一定的经济可预测性;从信号的传递效果来看,国际金融机构和国际信用评级机构起到了信号强化的作用。

CBI has started its trends worldwide since the 1980s. Based on a signal mechanism, the independence of Central Banks in developing countries acts as a magnet for the FDI. From the view point of the process of the mechanism, CBI in developing countries can be considered a regulation to enhance liability while from the view of real effect, following CBI are low inflation expectations, stable expectations of monetary policy and certain economic predictability.