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反倾销制度的福利效果实证考察 被引量:5

Empirical Study on Welfare Effect of Antidumping
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摘要 反倾销制度被认为是贸易救济手段之一,旨在保护国内产业和国内就业。但它往往无法实现这些目的,甚至适得其反。同时,反倾销程序被大量滥用,成为国内产业获得市场势力、形成和维持卡特尔的工具,导致国际贸易扭曲和国内竞争破坏,让国内消费者承担巨额成本。应该利用国际舞台积极推动国际反倾销协定的修改,使其更加完善。同时可以利用反倾销实施国反垄断执法机关的竞争倡导机制促使其国内法的变革,并利用其反垄断执法机制对滥用反倾销程序的企业进行反击。 Antidumping is considered as a trade remedy aiming at protecting domestic industries and jobs. However, this measure often fails in its professed goals, and sometimes even backfires. Also, the antidumping system is repetitively abused and sometimes becomes an instrument for domestic industries to seize market power and to form and maintain cartels. Such behaviors lead to the distor- tion of international trade and the disruption of domestic competition, burdening domestic consumers with huge costs. To address the problem, international fo- rums should be used proactively to press for amendments in international anti- dumping agreements. The domestic anti-trust agencies' advocacy competition should also be utilized to stimulate changes in the domestic trade law, and the antitrust enforcement power should be used to tackle enterprise abuses of anti-dumping procedures.
作者 兰磊
出处 《国际商务(对外经济贸易大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期112-121,共10页 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
关键词 反倾销 贸易救济 反垄断法 卡特尔 市场势力 Antidumping Trade remedy Antimonopoly law Cartel Marketpower
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参考文献11

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同被引文献47

  • 1向洪金,詹政,赖明勇.反倾销措施产业救济效果:基于寡占竞争模型的理论研究[J].南开经济研究,2011(3):143-153. 被引量:5
  • 2王伟,王先林.反垄断法视野中的反倾销问题[J].法学家,2007(2):78-83. 被引量:2
  • 3Aggarwal, Aradhna.2010.“Trade Effects of Anti - dumping in India: Who Benefits. ” The International TradeJounud,25{\)x 112-158.
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  • 7Konings,J.,and H.Vandenbussche.2008.“Heterogeneous Responses of Firms to Trade Protection.n Journal ofInternational Economics, 76(2) : 371 -383.
  • 8Pierce,J.R.2011.HPlant . level Responses to Antidumping Duties: Evidence from U.S.Manufacturers. ,, Journalof International Economics, 85 ( 2 ) : 222 -233.
  • 9Chandra,P. ,and C.Long.2013.“Anti - dumping Duties and their Impact on Exporters: Firm Level Evidencefrom China. ,’ World Development 95 (1) :169 -186.
  • 10Brambilla, I., G.Porto, and A.Tarozzi.2012.“Adjusting to Trade Policy : Evidence from U.S.AntidumpingDuties on Vietnamese Catfish.” The Review of Economics and Statistics t94(l) :304 -319.

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