论道德动机探究的科学证据

On the Scientific Evidence for the Investigation of Moral Motivation

道德判断与道德动机的关系是元伦理学领域长久不息的争论话题,其焦点在于如何看待无道德主义者——作出真诚的道德判断但是不具有相应动机的人。动机内在主义认为这种情况无法设想,外在主义则认为这恰恰构成了内在主义的反例。近来,有学者受到神经生理学研究的启发,认为大脑受损后产生的不道德行为构成了无道德主义者的新证据,但反对者认为,这种科学证据无助于解决旧有争论。本文试图对道德动机探究与这种科学证据的关系作出分析,认为在道德动机探究与科学证据的关系上应持有一种平衡的立场:新的科学证据确实无法一劳永逸地解决道德动机争论,但它们可能带来的启发没有理由被忽视。

The relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation has been consistently debated in metaethics. The focus of the debate is how to view the so called amoralists, i.e. those moralists who just make objective moral judgment without their own motivation being involved. Motivational internalists think this as unimaginable, while motivational externalists see this as counterexamples to motivational internalism. Recently, inspired by the neurophysiological study, some philosophers point out that certain patients suffering from brain damage constitute new evidence supporting the view of amoralists, but opponents think that this kind of scientific evidence can hardly help. In this paper I would like to investigate the relationship between the moral motivation debate and this new evidence, holding that a compromised position is expected: New evidence cannot resolve the old debate once for all, but we cannot ignore the inspiration it may provide.