市场竞争、管理者权力与薪酬粘性

Market Competition,Managerial Power and Compensation Stickiness

我国A股上市公司管理者薪酬存在明显粘性特征,无论是国有企业还是非国有企业,管理者权力对薪酬粘性均存在显著的正向作用,而且随着市场竞争加剧,管理者权力对薪酬粘性的影响显著增强。对不同产权性质企业的比较研究发现,市场竞争压力显著增强了非国有企业管理者权力与薪酬粘性之间的正相关关系,但由于国有企业面临的市场竞争较弱,其管理者面临薪酬管制,效用函数显著异于非国有企业,市场竞争对国企管理者权力和薪酬粘性关系的影响并不显著。

The managerial compensation of China＇s A-sham listed companies is characterized by stickiness. In both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, managerial power has a significantly positive influence on compensation stickiness. With the intensifying market competition, the influence exerted on compensation stickiness by the managerial power becomes significantly greater. A compara- tive study of the enterprises with different property rights reveals that market competition pressure has significantly enhanced the positive relationship between managerial power and compensation stickiness in non-state-owned enterprises. However, due to weaker market competition faced by state-owned en- terprises and strict remuneration regulations on their executives, the utility function is significantly dif- ferent from that of t3on-state-owned enterprises, so market competition has no significant impact on the relationship between managerial power and compensation stickiness in state-owned enterprises.