预测信息披露制度的有效性及其选择:基于博弈的视角

The Effectiveness and Choice of Forecasting Information Disclosure System:From the Prospective of Game Theory

预测信息所起的作用要远远大于历史信息,而对预测信息实行强制性披露还是自愿性披露决定着企业管理层的披露行为,从而决定了投资者所获预测信息的数量和质量,最终将影响证券市场的效率。本文在对博弈报酬进行严格论证的基础上,分别建立并求解了强制性预测信息披露制度和自愿性预测信息披露制度下的不完美信息博弈模型,计算并比较了两种信息披露制度下的弱完美贝叶斯纳什均衡所对应的社会福利值,从而找出了较为有效的信息披露制度。研究结果表明,强制性预测信息披露制度能打破由信息不对称所导致的恶性循环,并能对管理者构成有效的威慑。因此,强制性预测信息披露制度比自愿性预测信息披露制度更能增进社会福利,因而更为可取。

The forecasting financial information indeed has more effectiveness than historical one. The types of information disclosure systems, namely mandatory or voluntary ones, significantly affect the management＇s behaviors, thus deciding the quality of the information received by investors. And finally, this would affect the efficiency of the security market. Based on the above discussion, the voluntary and mandatory information disclosure game models under impact information are set up and used to compare their weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the help of social welfare function. Accordingly, the results from the analyses show that mandatory information disclosure system indeed has the effect to constraint the management＇s behaviors. And it is wise to choose mandatory forecasting information disclosure system.