奶站取消之博弈分析:基于质量控制视角

Analyze on the Milk Depot Cancellation Based on the Game Theory: The Analysis Frame of Quality-control

基于动态博弈理论,构建两种不同原奶收购模式下乳制品供应链质量控制模型,并对模型进行求解及数值模拟分析,比较两种模式下产品质量控制与检测水平,探讨奶站对乳制品产品质量控制的影响。结果显示,企业收购原奶模式不仅提高了制成品质量水平与原奶质量水平对不同品质制成品利润差、消费者索赔额度变化的灵敏度,而且降低了加工企业对原奶检测水平,减少了企业检测成本。然而,不同品质原奶价格差在对原奶质量控制水平产生激励的同时,降低了企业对原奶检测水平,导致奶农逆向选择行为的产生,最终致使原奶价格差对原奶质量水平激励无效。

In this paper,we presented two quality-control models for dairy supply chain with different supply patterns of raw milk based on the theory of dynamic game,comparing the levels of the product quality-control and inspection with different supply patterns of the raw milk and discussing the influence of milk depot on the product quality-control after solving and numerical simulating to the two models. The results show,compared with model of milk depot purchase raw milk,enterprise purchases raw milk directly would not only heighten the sensitivity of the levels of finished goods and raw milk to the variation profit difference and consumer claim amount,but also lower the inspection level and cut down the enterprise's inspection cost. However,though the price difference of different quality raw milk would provide incentive to the quality of raw milk,also lower the enterprise's inspection level,which would incur the farmer's adverse selection,so it is futile to improve the quality of raw milk.