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管理层网络、关系治理与银行风险承担 被引量:1

Management Networks,Relationship Governance and Bank Risk-taking
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摘要 管理层是各种社会关系的集合。蕴含社会资本的管理层关系网络必然影响银行风险。本文首次从社会网络视角考察了管理层网络与银行风险的关系,证实了管理层网络能够抑制银行风险。此外,本文推进了社会网络理论与银行治理理论的融合,并为监管当局对管理层行为尤其是董事兼任现象的监督和银行决策层是否建立网络联结提供了理论借鉴。 Management is the set of social network. Management Networks with social capital inevitably affect banks' risk-taking. We examine the relationship between management networks and bank risk from the perspective of social network and confirm that management networks' inhibiting effects on bank risk. Our study propelling the inte- gration of both the social network theory and the bank governance theory, providing theoretical references for regulato- ry authority on dealing with boards' part-time jobs and decision-makers on wheth ch,r, fi e If ~;~o
作者 丁蕾 曹廷求
出处 《金融发展研究》 2013年第9期15-19,共5页 Journal Of Financial Development Research
基金 国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD069) 国家自科基金项目(71272119) 教育部规划基金项目(12YJA790005)的部分研究成果
关键词 管理层网络 程度中心度 限制度 银行风险承担 management networks, degree centrality, constraint, bank risk-taking
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参考文献6

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二级参考文献81

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