公平偏好下销售回扣契约供应链协调

Supply chain coordination with sales-rebate contract under fairness preferences

针对传统的销售回扣契约无法实现供应链协调,引入普遍存在的公平偏好,探讨销售回扣契约对协调供应链的影响.假设在市场需求是随机的两阶段供应链中的零售商具有公平偏好,运用公平偏好模型,分别就零售商订货量小于销售回扣临界值和订货量大于等于销售回扣临界值这两种情形进行分析.研究发现加入公平偏好的销售回扣契约扩展了零售商与供应商自愿合作的前景,能提高供应链的整体利润和效用,得到充分合作的均衡结果,从而更好地协调供应链.最终使用算例验证了结论.

Aiming at the insufficiency that the traditional sales-rebate contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, this paper studies how sales-rebate contract influences the coordination of supply chain induced by fairness preferences. Assuming the retailer is fairness preferred in the market with random demand, the paper analyzes two situations, namely, retailer order less than the sales-rebate threshold and not less than the sales-rebate threshold by the fairness preferred model. We find that taking into consideration fairness preferences in sales-rebate contract broadens the voluntary cooperation prospects between suppliers and retailers, can increase the profit of the overall supply chain, and has the balanced result of fully cooperation, which better coordinates the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the model.