自身体验与别样的反思——舍勒论人格的自身被给予方式

Self-Experience and a Different Kind of Reflection——Max Scheler on the Way of Self-given of the Person

"人格"是舍勒现象学的核心概念。与近代哲学中的"自我"或"先验统觉的自我"不同,"人格"被舍勒赋予"不可对象化性"的根本特性。然而,如果"人格"永远不能以一种对象化的方式去把握,那么,它究竟如何自身被给予?这构成了舍勒人格现象学所要面对的首要难题。通过对康德思想的批评与反省,舍勒发展出一种现象学的人格认识论:这种不可对象化的人格,一方面通过前概念的、直接的、非对象化的、伴随性的"自身-体验"自身被给予,并且这种"自身-体验"构成其他一切第二性行为的基础;另一方面,通过作为"存在参与"的"一同飘荡着"的存在论式的反思的知识,人格自身被给予自身并获得其自身的同一性。正是这种"自身-体验"和别样的"反思"构成了舍勒现象学的人格认识论的核心。

the ego ＂Person＂ is the key concept in Max Scheler＇s phenomenology. Different from the ＂ego＂ or of transcendental apperception in modern philosophy, Scheler describes the essential character of person as un-objectification. By criticizing and reflecting the thoughts of Kant, Scheler develops a phenomenological epistemology of person： The un-objectified person, on the one hand, is self-given by pre-conceptual, direct, un-objectified, accompanied self-experience （Erleben）, which is the foundation of all the other secondary acts, and, on the other hand, is given to itself and gains its identity by the ＂hovering （ mitschwebend）＂ ontological reflexive knowledge （Wissen） as ＂being- participation （Teilnahme）＂. It is such a kind of ＂self-experience＂ and a different kind of ＂reflection＂ that constitute the core of Scheler＇s phenomenological epistemology of person.