拥挤收费的政治策略

The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing

通过收费缓解交通拥堵的政治可行性取决于谁获得通行费收入。指出如果收益被分配给城市,特别是高速公路经过的城市,拥挤收费取得政治成功的可能性最大。与已有的很多建议不同,指出城市是比个体驾驶人和区域政府更有力的收益申索人。基于行为经济学和政治科学理论并结合几个大都市区的数据,对提议进行解析和阐述。在洛杉矶,潜在的拥挤收费收入估计每年接近50亿美元,将这些收入分配至高速公路经过的城市对拥挤收费的实施是有政治影响力和促进作用的。

The political feasibility of using prices to mitigate congestion depends on who receives the toll revenue. We argue that congestion pricing on freeways will have the greatest chance of political success if the revenue is distributed to cities, and par- ticularly to cities through which the freeways pass. In contrast to a number of previous proposals, we argue that cities are stronger claimants for the revenue than either individual drivers or region- al authorities. We draw on theory from behavioral economics and political science to explain our proposal, and illustrate it with da- ta from several metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, where poten- tial congestion toll revenues are estimated to be almost $5 billion a year, distributing toll revenues to cities with freeways could be politically effective and highly progressive.