二项迫选对信任和可信赖性的非对称性影响

The Asymmetrically Effect of Dichotomous Choice on Trust and Trustworthiness

生活中,有时候我们需要作出是否信任或是否可以信赖的二分选择,有时候则允许表现出不同程度的信任与可信赖性。情景的不同是否会影响人们的信任与可信赖性呢?本研究使用假想的投资博弈和议价博弈发现,"是"和"否"的二项迫选的确会影响到人们的行为,对信任和可信赖性有着非对称性的影响。对于信任而言,二项迫选会使得信任程度较低的个体选择不信任他人;对于可信赖性而言,二项迫选会使可信赖性较低的个体表现得值得信赖。

In daily life, some situations need us to make a dichotomous choice whether trust others or not, or perform trustworthiness or not. Comparatively, we can act different levels of trust and trustworthi- ness in the other situations. Since situation is an important determinant of behaviors. The question is that： Do we perform trust and trustworthiness differently between situations that need dichotomous responses and diversified responses？ The present study explores the effect of dichotomous choices on trust nary bargaining game and investment game. Results showed that： （1） In and trustworthiness with imagi- bargaining game, 55.60 percent participants trusted others and 95.45 percent participants were trustworthiness; In investment game, 97.00 percent participants trusted others with different levels, and they invested 6.50 of 10 Yuan averagely and their mean return rate was more than half of gross profits. （2） The dichotomous choices of bargaining game influenced trust and trustworthiness significantly and asymmetrically. Near half of participants in bar- gaining game distrusted their co-players while almost all participants trusted others in different levels in investment game. （3） In investment game, participants performed different trustworthiness levels since they were all trustworthiness in bargaining game. It is concluded that dichotomous choices affects trust and trustworthiness asymmetrically. In concrete, dichotomous choice situation pushes participants who have a low trust level distrust while pulis participants who have a low trustworthiness level trustworthiness.