基于演化博弈的网络舆情传播的羊群效应研究

Herd Instinct of the Transmission of Network Public Opinion Based on Evolutionary Game

鉴于我国的特殊国情和庞大的网民基数,网络舆情对现实社会的影响巨大,并获得广泛关注。羊群效应不仅会影响网络舆情的传播过程,还会影响舆情的最终演化方向。若不对网民群体内部的羊群效应加以引导,可能对社会稳定造成威胁;若政府积极利用,可以使舆情向政府期望的方向演化。为了更好地认识网络舆情传播过程中的羊群效应,将演化博弈理论引入该问题的研究中。首先对羊群效应中的网民、政府进行简要界定,然后分别就网民群体内部、网民和政府之间建立演化博弈模型,并根据模型得出相应的指导意义。最后对本文内容进行简要总结,并指出研究的不足之处和今后的研究方向。

Because of China＇s specific national conditions and large number of intemet users, network public opinion has a great impact on the real world and draws wide attention. Herd instinct not only can affect the intemet public opinion＇s transmission process to a certain ex- tent but also can affect its evolution direction, and also can pose a threat to social stability as well if it is not reasonably guided. However, if the governments make good use of herd instinct, it is possible that the network public opinion might evolve toward the desired direction of government. To get a better understanding of herd instinct, this article attempts to introduce evolutionary game theory into this research. First, the article briefly defines governments and intemet users in this phenomenon of herd instinct. Then, two evolutionary game models arc established and some proposals are put forward. Finally, this paper gives a brief surmnmT of this study and points out its inadequacies and the future research priorities.