煤矿安全中多方利益群体的博弈分析

Extensive Form Game Model of Multiple Interest Groups in Colliery Safety

煤矿生产安全管理涉及政府、煤矿、工人等相互联系、制约的多方利益群体的博弈过程.分析煤矿安全系统中煤矿生产队、煤矿安全检查组及政府监督机构三方的博弈策略和博弈行为,研究博弈模型的均衡策略与模型参数取值,通过博弈模型演化过程,发现多方群体博弈的动力系统不存在进化稳定策略(ESS).为保证煤矿安全关联的三方利益群体的博弈策略选择的稳定性,要在现有煤矿安全检查监督规则的基础上对检查、监督等行为进行激励或约束,并对相应的约束激励措施进行讨论.

The colliery safety management involving the government, mining enterprises and workers,is a gambling process of multiple interest groups, which is interdependent and interactional in various levels. This paper applies extensive form game in coal mine safety system to research the strategies and behaviors of miners, inspectors and the government supervision organization. Analysis of the evolution process of the game model indicates that no ESS exists in the dynamic system. The stability of the game strategy of three interest groups requires colliery administrators to build incentive and restraining mechanism besides the basic rules of the inspection and supervision behaviors. Some Corresponding incentive and restraining measures are discussed.