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论代理权争夺的福利效应 被引量：5

On the Welfare Effect of the Contention for Procuration
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摘要 代理权争夺是上市公司股东惩罚未能实现公司利润最大化的管理层的最后工具。当持有异议股东与管理者争夺公司代理权时 ,由于市场预期进行代理权争夺的公司可能会被兼并 ,所以股价会上升 ,股价上升也就提高了股东的收益 ,而代理权争夺的失败也就是股东财富的损失 ,这就可以部分地解释代理权竞争成功率较高的原因。因此 。 Contention for procuration is the last resort for the shareholders of a listed company to punish the management who fail to maximize the company's profits. When the shareholders with objections contend with the management for procuration, the share price will go up, thus increasing the gains of the shareholders, The shareholders' failure in this contention means their loss of fortune. This can partly account for the comparatively high rate of success in the contention for procuration. Therefore, shareholders are the actual beneficiaries in the contention for procuration.
作者 殷醒民
机构地区 复旦大学经济学院
出处 《复旦学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2000年第5期60-66,共7页 Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）
关键词 代理权争夺 企业兼并 公司控制权 上市公司 contention for procuration, annexation of enterprises, control power
分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理] F271 [经济管理—企业管理]
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参考文献13

  • 1Henry G. Manne,"Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", Joumal of Political Econonty. Vol. 73(1965). pp. 110-120. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demasetz,"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Eoonomic Review, Vol. 62. pp, 777-795.
  • 2Linda Elizabeth De Angelo,"Managerical Competition,Information Costs,and Corporate Governance!the Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests",Journal of Accounting and eoonomics,Vol,10(1988),pp.3-36.
  • 3Peter Dodd and Jerold B.Warner,"On Corporate Governance:A Study of Proxy Contests,"Journal of Financial Eoonomics,Vol.11(1983,pp.401-438).
  • 4John Pound,"The Efficiency of Shareholder Voting:Evidence from Proxy Contests,"Journal of Financial Eoonomics,Vol.20(1988).pp.237-265.
  • 5Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel,"Voting in Corporate Law",Journal of Law and Ecomamics,Vol.26(1983).p.395.
  • 6Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart,"One Share,One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control,"Jourmal of financial Eoonamics,Vol.20(1988).p.175.
  • 7Milton Harris and Artur Raviv,"Corporate Govermance:Voting Rights and Majority Rules",Journal of Financial Eoonamics,Vol.20(1988).p.203.
  • 8Gregg Jarrell and Annette Poulsen,"Shark Repellents and Stock Price:The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments since 1980,"Journal of Financial Eoonamics.Vol.18(1987),p.435.
  • 9John Pound,"Shareholder Activism and Share Values:the Causes and Conssquences of Counter Solicitations Against Management Antitakeover Proposals,"in Patrick A.Caughan,Readings ing Mergers and Acquisitons,Blackwell,1994.p.238.
  • 10John Pound,"The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity:Some Direct Evidence",Journal of Low and Economics.Vol,30(1987).

同被引文献33

  • 1高洁.公司代理权争夺问题新探[J].财经科学,2004(5):25-28. 被引量：3
  • 2罗伯特．C．克拉克著 胡平 等译.公司法则[M].北京:工商出版社,1999..
  • 3J．弗雷德．威斯通 等著 李秉祥译.接管、重组与公司治理(第二版)[M].辽宁大连:东北财经大学出版社,2000..
  • 4Henry G. Manne, "Mergers and the Market for corporate control" , Journal of Political Economy. Vol.73 (1965) .pp.110-120.
  • 5Armen A. Alchian and Harold De Demsetz, "Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization" , American Economic Review,vol.62.pp.777-795.
  • 6Peter Dodd and Jerold B. Warner, "On Corporate Governance : A Study of Proxy Contests" , Journal of Financial Eeonomies,vol.11 (1983),pp.401-438.
  • 7John Pound, " Shareholder Activism on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence" . Journal of Law and Economics.Vol.30 (1987) .
  • 8Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, April 1983,.
  • 9Peter Dodd and Richard S. Ruback, "Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Financial Economies, December 1977.
  • 10D.Kummer and R. Hoffmeister, "Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers," Journal of Finance, May 1978.

引证文献5

复旦学报（社会科学版）
2000年 第5期

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