自闭症的原初交互主体性障碍假说:现象学精神病理学的主张

Dysfunction of Primary Intersubjectivity Theory in Autism: A Proposal from Phenomenological Psychopathology

传统的"心灵盲"理论基于理智主义的预设,将心理理论的发育迟滞与缺陷视为自闭症个体人际互动障碍的主要原因。本文借助现象学精神病理学的立场对上述基于理智主义的读心模式进行了批判,并提出了自闭症的原初交互主体性障碍假说。该假说认为,原初交互主体性是前理论的、奠基性的,其不仅具有个体发生学意义,也体现在成熟个体的人际互动中。通过分析自闭症个体的临床行为表现与第一人称报告,可以初步确认该群体存在原初交互主体性障碍。这驱使该群体不得不使用过度反思作为代偿方式,从而导致其人际互动障碍。

The mind-blindness theory proposed that children with autism spectrum conditions are delayed in developing a ＂theory of mind＂, but this presupposition is based on the epistemology of rationalism. According to the phenomenological psychopathology, this article critique this theoretical stance in mindreading. As an alternative, we outline a dysfunction of primary intersubjectivity theory as an alternative to mind -blindness theory, which incorporates evidence from both developmental and phenomenological studies to show that humans are endowed with important capacities for primary intersubjective understanding from birth or early infancy. Thus, primary intersubjectivity is pre-theoretical and fundierend, and autistic individuals have dysfunction in primary intersubjectivity. They use a hyperreflexivity as compensatory attempt to deal with this dysfunction, it induce the perplexity in daily interpersonal communications.