政治关系类型与高管薪酬——基于“两个差异性”的比较研究

Different types of Political Relations and Top Managers' Compensation: a Comparative Study on Different Controlling Shareholder's Nature and Marketization Degree

本文从控股股东性质、市场化程度两个维度对样本上市公司进行分组,构建面板数据进行实证检验并进行对比分析,研究了不同类型高管政治关系对上市公司高管薪酬一业绩敏感度的影响。研究发现,国有上市公司的高管薪酬一业绩敏感度较高,而且显著受政治关系的影响,不同类型政治关系的影响不同,在不同市场化程度的地区其影响也不同;民营上市公司的高管薪酬与业绩不具有显著相关性,但政治关系会提高其高管薪酬一业绩敏感度。

Many Top managers of listed companies have Political relations in China. They are or were govern- ment officials, NPC representatives, CPCCC members and so on. Considering the special economic environment, the political relations play an important role in building Guanxi with central and local governments and rent see- king. It should be the urgent matter for listed companies to research and design effective salary incentive mecha- nism. This paper helps in the design of salary incentive mechanism and offers further support for the salary incentive theory. Different with other researches, the sample companies in this paper are divided into four groups according to their controlling shareholder＇s nature and local marketization degree. Thus we can know how political relations affect the PPS （pay performance sensitivity） specifically. Different types of political relations function differently, so the relations are divided into two types：official rela- tions and non-official relations. There are many ways to quantify the relations and this paper chose two of them ： （ 1 ） relation level, which is the manager＇s position rank in government or the level of his/her membership in the NPC and the CPCCC ; （2） connection degree, which is the percentage of the politically related top managers in all man- agement. Using sample companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market between 2005 and 2009, this pa- per set up panel data model to investigate official relations＇ effects on the PPS. By using descriptive statistical analysis, we find that top managers＇ compensation are significant different be- tween the groups, so are their political relations. The SOEs （ state-owned enterprises） pay more than private compa- nies. Companies in east area （where are more developed） pay more than those in the west （where are less devel- oped）. About the political relations, the private companies groups are affected more than the SOEs groups by mar- ketization degree. Private companies in the west have more political relations. Considering types of the relations, the effects are different. The SOEs have more official relations, and both the SOEs and the private companies are affect- ed significantly by marketization degree. The SOEs in the east area have more official relations than those in the west. The private companies in the west area have more official relations than those in the east. Private companies have more non-official relations. The SOEs in the west area have more non-official relations than those in the east. By means of regress analysis we find some conclusions as follows. （1） The SOEs＇ PPS is higher than private companies＇; （2） Companies in the west are affected more by political relations than those in the east; （3） Political re- lations cab increase private companies＇ PPS, especially in the west area; （4） The effects of political relations on the SOEs＇ PPS are complicatedly. In the east area, non-official relations increase the PPS and official relations＇ effects are notable. In the west area, non-official relations decrease the PPS and official relations increase the PPS; （5） Top managers＇ share-holding rates are significantly positive correlated with their monetary compensation, however, the stock ownership incentive is still not a conventional way to motivate the top managers as monetary compensation. It＇s a drawback of this paper just considering the effects of controlling shareholder＇s nature and marketization degree. Top managers＇ compensation and the PPS are affected by many other factors except for controlling shareholder＇s nature and marketization degree. Further studies are needed before we know how these factors affect top managers＇ compensation and the PPS. From the empirical results, we can also find that the effects of top managers＇ political relations on the PPS are complicated. How political relations function concretely in a company9 It＇s still a mystery and is worthy of further research.