经济适用房定价微分博弈模型及福利分析

Welfare Analysis and Pricing Model of Differential Game of Affordable Housing

经济适用房存废之争日益激烈,尤其是经济适用房定价问题广受质疑。地方政府与开发商博弈经济行为影响到经济适用房的定价和供给量。本研究采用Stackelberg微分博弈模型演绎了经济适用房定价、供给量和政府补偿的收敛趋势,进一步阐释了限价房摇号随机配给机制可能造成的住房福利损失。结论是地方政府采取的激励强度和开发商的利润追求动力驱动了经济适用房定价过程,经济适用房不能废弃,并且供给量需要维持在一定的水平,切实保障对经济适用房的住房边际效用高的群体购买,才能减少公共住房福利损失。

Affordable housing system in China is more and more disputed and especially its pricing problem is in question. Game economic activities of local government and house developers affect pricing and quantity of supply of affordable housing. The Stackelberg differential game model is adopted to simulate convergence trends of pricing and quantity of supply of affordable housing and local governmental compensation, and moreover, the paper elaborates that the mechanism of stochastic allocation by shaking serial number may cause damage to pub- lic house welfare. The finding shows that interaction between the incentives intensity of local government and the pursuit profit of developers drives the pricing process, the affordable housing system is not discarded and keeps up a certain quantity of supply of affordable housing, and the people with high housing marginal utility is as- sured to have opportunity to buy affordable house, which will reduces the loss of public house welfare.