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基于企业专利质押的信贷风险决策 被引量:9

Decisions on the Credit Risks Based on Patent-backed Loans of Enterprises
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摘要 回顾了质押融资的研究发展历程,针对专利质押融资的新情景,事先不给定专利价值的概率分布,考虑专利的可替代和时间贬损性,构建基于不完全信息条件下的最小最大遗憾准则的信贷决策模型,分析得出了专利在贷款终期价值的解析解,并结合Kuhn-Tucker条件给出了专利价值的概率分布在最"糟糕"情形下的银行贷款利率和配给量的最优解。研究结果表明:信贷终期的专利价值由只考虑专利市场需求变化时的初始价值、价值变量的一阶原点矩以及二阶原点矩等参量决定。银行的贷款利率与专利的终期价值呈负相关关系,而银行对专利质押融资的配给量与专利的终期价值未发现明确相关性。 This paper reviewes the reserach development of pledge financing. As to Patent-backed loans, supposing that the function of patent value doesn~ t follow any determined probability distribution and the value of patent is of the substitutability and time derogatory, this paper establishes a credit risk decision-making mechanism for banks under imperfect information using min-max regret criterion. It is found that the analytical solution to liquidation value of patent at the end of the loan; and that the optimal solution to the r and q of Patent-backed loans model by Kuhn-Tucker condition. The results show that.. Firstly, final credit value of patent is determined by the initial value of only considering the patent market demand, the first order origin moment and the second order origin moment of the patent variable; Secondly, there is a negative correlation between the loan interest rates and the final value patent; Thirdly no clear correlation was found between credit rationing and the patent value at the end of patent-backed loan period.
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2013年第9期39-43,共5页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家知识产权局专利运用课题(GZ201204 GZ201205) 江苏省软科学计划项目(BR2012040) 江苏省研究生培养创新工程基金资助项目(CXLX11 0037)
关键词 专利 质押融资 风险决策 最小最大遗憾准则 Patent Assets Pledge Financing Risk Decisions Min-Max Regret Criterion
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