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基于不完全得分信息的双边匹配决策方法 被引量:7

Decision Method for Two-sided Matching Based on Incomplete Score Information
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摘要 针对基于不完全得分信息的双边匹配问题,提出了一种匹配决策方法。首先,将不完全得分信息转化为不完全满意度信息;其次,以每方主体满意度总和最大为目标,构建了双目标匹配模型;考虑到模型中系数已经规范化,运用线性加权法将双目标匹配模型转化为单目标模型,并通过模型求解获得匹配方案。最后,实例分析说明了所提方法的有效性。 This paper proposes a matching decision method with respect to the two-sided matching problem based on incomplete score information. Firstly, information of incomplete scores is converted into information of incomplete satisfaction degrees. To maximize the sum of satisfaction degrees of agents on each side, a hi-objective matching model is set up. Consider coefficients of the model have been normalized; the linear weighted method is used to convert the hi-objective matching model into a single objective model. By solving the model, the matching alternative is obtained. Lastly, an example analysis illustrates the validity of the proposed method.
作者 乐琦
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2013年第9期79-83,共5页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71261007 71261006) 教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(12YJC630080) 江西省自然科学基金资助项目(20132BAB201015) 江西省自然科学基金青年项目(20122BAB211009) 江西省社会科学"十二五"规划项目(12GL32) 江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目(GJJ13292) 江西财经大学2012年度校级重点课题(05682015)
关键词 双边匹配 不完全得分 优化模型 匹配方案 Two-sided Matching Incomplete Score Optimization Model Matching Alternative
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参考文献14

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二级参考文献104

共引文献76

同被引文献51

  • 1肖人彬,程贤福,廖小平.基于模糊信息公理的设计方案评价方法及应用[J].计算机集成制造系统,2007,13(12):2331-2338. 被引量:30
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  • 10Abdulkadirolu A, Sonmez T. School choice: A mechanism design approach[J]. American Economic Review, 2003,93 (3) : 729- 747.

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