摘要
幸福是否可以成为道德教育的目的,是古典德育哲学留给我们的疑问和争议之一。亚里士多德留下的是犹豫和徘徊,而康德给予人们的则是偏激和无情。解决这一问题的关键取决于我们解决问题的立场和方法,而不是这一问题原有的答案。如果能够在幸福大于道德还是道德大于幸福,或到底道德应当是以自己为目的,还是在自己之外寻找目的上有了基本的立场,我们就有了判断幸福是否可以成为德育目的的依据和基础,我们就能回答什么样的道德教育才是真正"道德的"问题。全部的理由不仅在于我们对道德的理解,更在于我们对人性的看法。道德如果不能增进人性,那不仅道德没有意义,而且道德教育也没有意义。这样的道德就是不道德的,而这样的道德教育就是不道德的道德教育。
Whether happiness can be the goal of moral education is one of the questions and controversies left over by classic moral education philosophy. Aristotle leaves us hesitation, while Kant gives us extremity and ruthlessness. The key to solve this problem depends upon our standpoint and method to solve problems, but not on the original answer of this question. If we have a basic view on whether happiness is greater than moral or vice versa, or whether morality ought to aim at itself, or to seek for other aims besides itself, we shall able to judge whether happiness can be the goal of moral education, and to answer the question of what kind of moral education is really "moral". The whole reason lies more in our view on human nature than in our understanding of morality. If morality should fail to improve human nature, then morality and moral education as well are to no avail. For, this kind of morality is an immoral morality; whereas moral education is an immoral education of morality.
出处
《山东师范大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
2013年第5期95-101,2,共7页
Journal of Shandong Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
关键词
道德教育
德育哲学
人性设计
幸福优先
moral education, moral philosophy, human nature design, happiness preferred