基于技术许可的产业集群内双寡头企业合作创新研究

Cooperative Innovation Game Analysis on Duopoly Firms in Industrial Cluster based on Technology License

产业集群的特性能促进创新成果扩散,但同时也可能降低集群成员的积极性,而引入技术许可进行合作创新是解决上述问题的一个重要方法。在考虑产业集群内企业的差异性的基础上,引入了集群企业间距离和衰减系数,分析了距离和衰减系数对两个生产同质产品的寡头企业创新决策的影响。研究发现,即使在存在创新扩散的情况下,企业还是会选择创新以降低成本。进一步研究了合作创新时的最优决策,得到了在何种水平的技术许可费下总利润会达到合作创新时的情形,此时企业之间的距离越小,技术许可费用越高。

The characteristics of industrial cluster can promote the diffusion of innovation, while also can reduce the enthusiasm of innovation of cluster members. Introducing technology license for cooperative innovation can resolve the problem. Considering differ- ence between the enterprises in the industrial cluster, this paper introduces ＂distance＂ and ＂attenuation coefficient＂. The article analy- zes how the ＂distance＂ and ＂attenuation coefficient＂ affect the innovation decision-making of two oligarch enterprises producing homo- geneity products. The article draws the conclusions that the enterprises could choose innovation to reduce the cost even if innovation dif- fusion exists. And the article discusses the optimal decision when cooperative innovation,gets the situation that what level of technology license fee could make the total profits reach the amount of cooperative innovation. At this time the smaller the distance between enter- prises is, the higher the technology license fee is.